refer to the decisions and reasoning of other constitutional courtsnot always to agree but rather to refine and sharpen understandings, in contemporary contexts, of such basic concepts as human dignity, equality, and freedom.
Many judges and scholars celebrate this transnational constitutional consciousness. Professor Lorraine Weinrib of Canada has argued that there is a transnational constitutional method, founded in a basic commitment to human dignity and applying the principles of proportionality in measuring the lawfulness of derogations from protected rights. 5 Professor Donald Kommers of the United States has explored how German constitutional law and its commitments to human dignity could inform constitutionalism more generally. Justice Michael Donald Kirby of Australia praises increasing judicial openness to learning from other constitutional courts, 6 and President Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court draws widely on comparative material to offer a normative vision of the role of constitutional courts. 7 Some members of the United States Supreme Court, including Chief Justice William Rehnquist, have embraced the possibility of considering the constitutional decisions of other nation's courts. 8 The potential benefits of comparative constitutional learning are many. They include the further development of the general understandings of core concepts, such as human dignity and equality, understandings that can aid in resolving questions that arise under the many constitutions of the world invoking similar ideas in similar language of human dignity, freedom, and equality. Comparative constitutional study offers the possibility of sharpened insight into aspects of one's own system or provisions, of how and why they work together in a distinctive way. In some cases, comparison suggests that what may have seemed essential to constitutionalism are, rather, choices made by particular polities not necessary for other reasonable forms of constitutionalism. 9 Confronting other national court decisions and explaining disagreements with them may elicit better reasoning based on a more complete understanding of the differences between forms of constitutionalism. 10 Comparative constitutional study may also shed light on interpretive methodologies and the implications of different methodologies for the role(s) of courts.
11 For those interested in the operation of legal or political institutions, comparative constitutional study offers a varied field of data about the relationship between structures and outcomes, such as stability, peace, protection of civil liberties, or economic welfare. Further, comparative knowledge may serve as a substitute for experience in constitution making, experience that most constitutional decision makers in the world lack. Comparative constitutional study, however, also has its limitations-most notably, for the purposes of this essay, those deriving from the need to avoid the temptation to examine other constitutional systems only through the lens of the system one is most acquainted with, while failing to seek both critical distance from one's own system and a contextualized understanding of other systems. 12 For all the richness of transnational judicial discourse about rights, there is a relative dearth of comparative judicial exploration of issues of federalism, even at a time of renewed interest in federalism associated with the wave of constitution making in the 1990s. Federal solutions have been rejected in the former Czechoslovakia, 13 reformed in Russia, advanced in Belgium and South Africa, 14 Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational judicial discourse 93 states themselves. "Postmodern tribalism" 18 has led to difficult conflicts that challenge the international legal norm of uti possidetis-the principle of the territorial integrity of existing states within former colonial boundaries. The principle of self-determination of peoples, recognized in at least two major international human rights conventions but of contested meaning, 19 can be invoked-in opposition to the principles of territorial integrity and national state control over internal government structures-to support consociational solutions, federal devolution, or secessionary movements. According to Thomas Franck, however, the right of self-determination in international law "does not give minorities a legal right to secede . . ." but, rather, implies commitments to internal democracy and to the rights of minority groups to enjoy their own culture, religion, or language-commitments that federalism may be able to fulfill. 20 This article explores both limitations and possibilities of comparative constitutional understandings for some of the difficult legal challenges of federalism. The limitations, which may be reflected in the relatively less extensive transnational judicial discourse about federalism than over individual human rights, are framed by two phenomena described in part 2 below. First, federal systems are, in a sense, "package deals" with interlocking parts such that the interpretation of any one part is influenced by features of the whole. Second, federal systems generally emerge from historically contingent compromises between existing holders of power, in some contrast to adoptions of individual rights provisions (that may be domestic versions of transnational or international models). Because there are significant variations among the historical compromises and "package deals" of federalism, interpretations of powerallocating clauses in one federal constitution may be readily distinguishable from and thus appear to have limited utility for judicial interpretation of another, as discussed in part 3.
Yet comparative constitutional understandings about federalism can play an important role in adjudicating questions of structural relations, whether those questions arise for constitution drafters or for constitutional courts, as in recent decisions on "commandeering" and secession. Comparative experience suggests a range of variations in whether commandeering of subnational units is permitted, and it raises significant cautions about constitutionalizing general rights of secession. As discussed in part 4 below, both of these issues have arisen in the space of constitutional silences and raise broad questions of government relations. In giving meaning to those silences, comparative experience may be of particular value in identifying ranges of consequences from different choices. The Secession Reference case also illuminates the role of constitutional ambiguity, deferred constitutional decision making, and constitutionally required negotiation, thereby creating new possibilities for transnational learning and critique.
Federalism, package deals, and historically contingent compromise
It is not difficult to find decisions by constitutional courts in one nation drawing on decisions by other nations' constitutional courts, especially in human rights cases. 21 The South African Constitutional Court has referred in detail not only to decisions but also to the reasoning of other constitutional courts of Australia, the United States, India, Botswana, and Namibia, among others. 22 The Canadian Supreme Court in recent years has self-consciously claimed the mantle of a cosmopolitan constitutional culture, characterizing Canada as a leader in the international community against the death penalty 23 and referring to the constitutional decisions of other courts. 24 And even though Australia does not have a constitutional provision explicitly protecting freedom of speech, its High Court has invoked foreign freedom of expression case law in deriving constitutional protection of political speech from constitutional commitments to representative democracy. 25 Transnational judicial reliance on constitutional federalism decisions also exists, but appears somewhat less common in contemporary decisions (at least in readily searchable English-language cases). 26 Justice Felix Frankfurter relied on Canadian tax immunity cases in opinions on U.S. tax immunity in the 1930s and 1940s, 27 Justice Stephen Breyer has urged consideration of comparative federal structures in an important dissent, 28 There are a number of possible explanations for the apparent difference. One explanation might be simply that there are far more countries with constitutions having individual rights provisions (and thus far more decisions on individual rights issues) than there are constitutionally federal national states. 39 That said, Canada is a federal nation and its Court now seems to resort to comparative constitutional law in individual rights cases to a greater extent than in federalism cases. 40 Another explanation might be that, for several reasons, courts and the judges who sit on them have come to believe that individual rights are their particular charge in a way that permits self-identification as "constitutional court judges" around the world. 41 Newer courts in societies in which judicial review is not well-established may seek both to establish their legitimacy and to solidify a popular constituency with rulings on individual rights claims against the government.
42 To the extent that individual rights are a greater focus of judicial energy one might imagine judges making a greater investment in comparative learning in those areas. Moreover, it may be that the media, both general and scholarly, have focused more on individual rights issues-the death penalty, abortion, free speech-and that it is easier to gather information about those issues than about issues of structure. A further explanation may lie in the nature of comparative constitutional methodology itself, one that imposes certain cautions and limits on the usefulness to jurists of a certain class of federalism cases. Although comparison generally requires a degree of skepticism about (a) the choice of categories of comparison and (b) the context of interpretive questions, federalism questions are particularly likely to raise difficult comparability problems, for two related reasons. First, federalism arrangements are, by nature, interdependent and complex package deals. Second, these packages are likely to be the result of specific, historically contingent compromises, serving as "a practical rather than a principled accommodation of competing interests" and thus arguably less amenable to transnational understandings. 
Package deals
Although different scholars use different formulations, a persistent theme in the writing about federalism is that in such systems the constitution establishes a "balance," or a set of relationships, between different levels or structures of government. 44 No single feature defines this balance or relationship; rather, federalism arrangements embodied in constitutions are typically what I would call "package deals." For example, in the United States, the enumeration of the federal government's powers is only one of several structural mechanisms for maintaining a federal balance. 45 Others, described by James Madison in the Federalist Papers, included (a) the role of state governments in the conduct of elections for federal offices (including the selection of federal senators by state legislatures, a now-obsolete provision); (b) the likelihood that representatives (who must be "inhabitants" of their state) will feel more attachment to their own states than to the nation; and (c) the greater number of individuals employed in state government than federal government-a phenomenon still true today. 46 Madison also suggested that fixed and regular elections would prevent the federal government from building up systematic extensions of military power over the states. 47 The federalism provisions in the U.S. Constitution also include the guarantee to the states of equal representation in the Senate, the requirement for both houses of Congress to concur in legislation, the provision that the equal representation of the states in the Senate cannot be modified by constitutional amendment without the consent of the affected state, the prohibition on the creation of a new state from the territory of other states without the consent of both Congress and the legislatures of the concerned states (thus securing state boundaries), the Senate's role in confirming (or not) Supreme Court justices, and the requirement for the ratification of proposed constitutional amendments by three-fourths of the states, each acting separately. 48 The U.S. Constitution is not unique in the degree to which federalism permeates structural arrangements. 49 The same can be said for Canada, Germany, and other federal nations. Federal constitutions may include very specific rights, or prohibitions on the conduct of subnational or national governments, designed to protect distinctive interests of other constituent parts of the nation or their members, such as Canada's provisions for minority religious education in its 1867 Constitution Act. 50 And the allocations or enumerations of powers in federal systems show considerable variations; for example, family law in the United States is often treated as "naturally" belonging 4 (1999) . As discussed further below, individual rights provisions of constitutions may also be understood as systemic in character (and the result of compromise); the claim, here, is that federalism-related provisions are likely to be more so.
to the states, 51 while in Germany, Canada, and Australia some aspects of "family law" are within national government powers.
52
Significant differences exist not only as to allocations and prohibitions of powers but also in the organization of the governmental structures of federal systems. Most federal systems have an upper house that is connected in some way to the interest of the subnational units, but the nature of this representation differs significantly as does the scope of the upper house's role. In Canada, the Senate is far weaker than in the U.S.; 53 in Germany, the Bundesrat's concurrence is required for many, though not all, types of federal legislation. 54 Federalism intersects, as well, with the division and allocations of legislative and executive power. In Germany, it is the right of the subnational governments to administer most federal laws; in the U.S., the federal government is generally prohibited from requiring the subnational units to carry out federal laws. 55 Some have argued that presidentialism and divided government offer added security for federal systems by providing subnational units with multiple locations of national power at which to voice and express disagreement. 56 Others would suggest that party organization in proportional voting systems may provide compensating mechanisms for the expression of disagreement. 57 The basic point is that the balance of power in connection with federalism issues may vary depending on to approaches that permit substantial central government control over the existence, boundaries, and government structure of the constituent parts. 59 Yet each of these aspects interacts with other aspects of the federal structure to form the constitutional infrastructure for the operation of constitutional federalism. 60
Historically contingent political compromises
Not only are federalist constitutional arrangements peculiarly interdependent, but they are also particularly likely to reflect political compromises between existing power holders. In this sense, the meaning of particular parts of the federal deal may not be as amenable to general, transnational reasoning as provisions for individual rights, although rights provisions may result from compromise as well. 61 This claim, which I understand to be controversial, is supported by the following tentative observations.
Constitutions are created by, or require the approval of, existing power holders; existing power holders have strong incentives to be able to envision present and future balances and shifts of power depending on different structures of Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational judicial discourse 105 58 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V (prohibiting departure from rule of equal suffrage for each state in the Senate by amendment procedure without consent of the state involved); GG [Constitution] art. 79(3) (F.R.G.) (prohibiting amendments to the Basic Law that affect "the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation in the legislative process," or the principle laid down in the chapter on Basic Rights or of article 20, which, inter alia, states that Germany "shall be a democratic and social federal state" in which "all public authority emanates from the people") (official translation as of March 1995).
governance; 62 and constitution drafters have some incentives to respond to those concerns. Thus, the South African Constitutional Court candidly explained, one of the controlling "constitutional principles" (by which the validity of a proposed Constitution would be judged) had been adopted in order "to encourage political formations which had refused to participate in the transition process to change their minds and to support the transition to a new political order." 63 Another interesting example occurred when the Czech Republic, in the conversion from a federal to a unitary state, provided for a bicameral legislature (including a Senate), upon dissolution of the Czech and Slovak federal republic, in part to accommodate the interests of existing deputies in the Federal Assembly of the dissolving federation. 64 Note that power elites involved directly in constitutional drafting and design may be better able to determine the effects of structural rules than general "taxpayer citizens," even though citizen interest in constitution making may be higher than interest in ordinary legislation.
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That the drafters can envision the consequences of power-allocating provisions for their own future does not necessarily mean that they will not produce well-designed institutional structures; it does suggest, however, that the institutional design will be intimately connected with existing (and projected) distributions of power. Drafters of structural provisions have strong incentives to consider the future consequences of the rules. 66 Granted, both the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SALR 744, 862 (CC). Constitutional principle CP XVIII.2 provided that: "The powers and functions of the provinces defined in the Constitution, including the competence a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its province, shall not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in this Constitution." 64 An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 242-51 (1986) (arguing that the public has strong incentives to devise constitutions that constrain enactment of "special interest" legislation and that constitutions are more likely to be public-regarding than statutes); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 4-5 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (arguing that, in "constitutional moments," people have heightened interest in and regard for public law compared to times of "ordinary politics").
the design and approval of structural provisions may suffer from some of the limitations, observed in experimental psychology, that affect the ability to extrapolate readily from the "rules of the game" to the consequences for likely success in future circumstances. 67 Understanding the connection between the principles at work in structuring governance (i.e., the rules of the game) and their results may be difficult for both constitution designers and members of the public. The drafters, however, are likely to have some self-interested incentives at work in shaping the design of governance structures that may differ from those of the general public.
Although similar considerations may affect the drafting of some individual rights provisions, there are individual rights, often included in constitutions, that stand on a different footing. Some rights-e.g., rights designed to secure freedom from torture or from arbitrary detention, freedom of expression, or freedom of religion-protect aspects of human personality far more widely shared and valued than the political offices created in governmental structures. Other individual rights, e.g., those relating to property, may be meaningfully enjoyed across a more limited spectrum of a population, depending on economic situations and understandings of property, and may be of particular concern to those who already hold more power in the design process.
68 But With respect to the claim that some individual rights, e.g., freedom from torture, or freedom of religion, stand on a different footing, I recognize the difficulty in characterizing, in the abstract, the motivations of multimember bodies for including such provisions in constitutions: Does their inclusion reflect a principled, public-regarding view about their content? Does it reflect an awareness that the population, which must approve a proposed constitution, desires such rights and can monitor their content? Or is the influence of international and comparative models or the incentives of because so many protections in a bill of rights appear very directly related to human flourishing generally, it may be easier (both for designers and for popular constituencies whose approval is required) to envision their operation in a variety of settings-and to predict what is desirable-than with respect to the structural "rules of the game." The claim that federalism provisions are more likely to reflect hardbargained-for compromises and are thus less readily subject to transnational reasoning from shared principles is subject to challenge from many directions. All legal texts (other than theocratic or dictatorial decrees) arguably represent some degree of compromise among those empowered to deliberate and enact them-perhaps the compromises behind a federal structure are simply more transparent than those behind a constitutional bill of rights. 69 Even with respect to individual rights, those holding sufficient power to draft a constitution may be differently situated from the citizenry as a whole, affecting the content of rights they want included. It might also be objected that the nature of constitution drafting will vary too much, given the variety of circumstances, to warrant such generalizations. Those who draft incremental amendments, for example, may bring to bear more of the perspective of an ongoing government; on the other hand, major constitutional changes during periods of intense crisis (as Jon Elster suggests are likely when entirely new constitutions are produced) 70 may be impelled quite differently, for example, by prior failures of governance or particular forms of abuse, leading to a focus that may or may not correspond to the federalism-individual rights classification suggested above.
International Archetypes?
There is, however, an additional reason to think that individual rights clauses are more likely to be illuminated through the kind of transnational judicial constitutional discourse, discussed above, than particular federalism provisions. Modern constitutions' bills of rights-at least in their main outline-have behind them a considerably greater degree of transnational 108 V. C. Jackson international or supranational bodies such that bills of rights are now simply an expected part of a document called "constitution" and thus less subject to bargaining and compromise?
69 It might thus be denied that legal texts can be distinguished from each as either the product of "compromise" or "principle." Cf. Macey, supra note 65, at 232-33, 261-68 (suggesting that judges lack capacity for distinguishing public-from private-regarding statutes). Although compromises among different groups of power holders can be identified in rights-drafting., see, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 61, at 278 (describing how Canada's "override" clause was a compromise between the prime minister of Canada and the premier of Saskatchewan), my claim is that compromise over federalism provisions is relatively more pervasive. 70 See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 370
(1995) ("new constitutions almost always are written in the wake of a crisis or exceptional circumstance of some sort").
consensus, as expressed in international human rights conventions. 71 Indeed, international human rights norms may be playing the role of a body of archetypes against which modern constitution drafters take their measure. 72 In contrast to the profusion of human rights norms, international legal norms on government organization are far less highly developed. While international law scholars debate the extent to which there is an international legal norm favoring democracy, international law on governmental organization and structure-the lifeblood of federalism-is inchoate at best. 73 As I have suggested elsewhere, these differences may reflect the degree to which federalist structures are further removed from common human experiences than are the subjects of many bill of rights provisions: "The reasons for the relatively greater specificity about individual rights than about forms of governance [in international legal conventions] may have to do with the inescapable ubiquity of human beings as a central concern of any system of governance, as compared to the variability of the particular forms of political and social organization addressed by constitutions." 74 This variability, in turn, relates to the distinctively interdependent and variable "packages" of federalism. 75 Even if one could agree on no other cause for the greater development of international human rights norms than historical circumstances, 76 the presence of these international norms may contribute to the sense of what Justice Albie Sachs has referred to as a "world jurisprudence" of constitutional rights. 
Allocations of powers and the limits of transnational discourse
Because federal constitutional arrangements are typically put together as a specific "compromise" among existing power holders and because these arrangements are typically part of a set of interrelated arrangements (a "package deal"), it can be difficult to identify particular power-allocating provisions, likely to be the subject of constitutional interpretation, that are sufficiently comparable to permit ready insight from the decisions of other constitutional courts.
78 An example will illustrate this claim. resemblance to the provision of the U.S. Constitution giving Congress the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 80 Yet interpretations of the Canadian "trade and commerce" power have been more restrictive than interpretations of the "Commerce . . . among the several states" clause in the U.S. Constitution. Although differences in national history and in the structure of judicial review may bear importantly on a full account, differences apparent on the face of the written constitutional documents themselves suggest the complexity of any direct comparison. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, section 92 of Canada's 1867 Constitution Act specifies the competencies of the provinces, a specification that has been invoked in Canadian case law limiting the scope of national power (for example, to prohibit federal labeling requirements for beer). 81 The U.S. Constitution contains no reservations of specific regulatory powers to the states analogous to section 92.
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Specific allocations of powers in federal systems vary as to whether they are held at the national or subnational level, 83 further limiting the possibilities for the kind of transnational judicial discourse seen in discussions of the meaning of freedom of expression or cruel and degrading punishment. For example, in Canada the national government has an explicit power over "marriage and divorce," while the provinces have power over the "solemnization" of marriage. (noting importance to Quebec of being able to control its distinctive jurisprudence in explaining restrictive interpretation of national legislative power in Canada); HOGG, supra note 53, § § 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.4 (describing distinctive constitutional development in Canada, in contrast to U.S., in its gradual evolution from British control to independence and in not having a single comprehensive constitutional document). My point is that even where constitutional texts allocating federal powers appear similar in language, surrounding and related provisions may provide grounds for divergent understandings.
In the United States, marriage and family relations are not explicitly referred to in the Constitution but courts derived a presumptive ban against federal courts considering questions of "domestic relations," reflecting the assumption that family law is for the states. 85 In Canada, the national government has power over criminal law, 86 while in the U.S. the states have the general "police power," including the power to make criminal laws, 87 though the federal government can also enact criminal laws if they are within other federal powers.
88
Such differing allocations of specific powers (and the history that stands behind those allocations) pose challenges to transnational discourse about the meaning of any particular enumerated power. Interpretation of powers at one level may be affected by other powers enumerated to the same level.
89 Powers held at the subnational level may be interpreted differently from powers held at the national level, if only to take account of the fact that (at least in symmetrical federations) other subnational parts must be able to exercise the same powers as well.
90 By contrast, in modern Western constitutions human rights provisions typically constrain all levels of government. Although common methodological and interpretive questions about federalism may be identified (for example, should courts presume a fair degree of concurrency of national and subnational powers or, instead, seek clear lines of separation 91 ), analysis of particular powers will often be conditioned by differences in what powers are allocated to what level, as well as by the context of interdependent government structures discussed above. Structural differences between "federal balances," for example, in the United States and Canada, though not necessarily alluded to in judicial opinions, might bear on a constitutional court's interpretive stance. The Canadian Senate, as noted above, is a weaker body than the U.S. Senate. Rather than being independently elected, members of Canada's Senate are appointed by the federal government 92 and may be deemed-from a structural point of view-less likely vigorously to represent the interests either of the provincial governments or of the people of a province; by contrast, the U.S. Senate, for its first 150 years was selected in a manner determined by state legislatures and, more recently, has been popularly elected. To the extent that the structure of a national government functions to buttress the role of the subnational units, Canadian federalism is thus, arguably, weaker and might need to rely to a greater extent on judicial enforcement of power allocating constitutional provisions. Canada, moreover, has a parliamentary rather than presidential system of governance. 93 The hurdles national legislation faces in the U.S. involve three institutions-the Senate, the House, and the presidencyeach of which represents constituencies over a different time period and which may be controlled by different political parties. In Canada, government legislative programs (at least in theory) ought to be easier to put into effect, even in the face of some provincial disagreement, 94 a difference that might bear on the question of the degree of deference courts should give to national legislation. 95 In short, the range of differences in the allocation of powers and
Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational judicial discourse 113 92 See HOGG, supra note 53, § 9.4(c) (indicating that "the Senate has never been an effective voice of regional or provincial interests," in part because of acceptance that, given its appointive nature, the Senate is subordinate to the House). the interpretive questions raised by the need to understand those allocations within a broader federal system are significant challenges to any easy transnational discourse about the interpretation of the powers of national and constituent governments in federal systems.
Relational federalism and comparative constitutionalism
Is comparative experience likely to be of more relevance to judicial resolution of issues involving not the interpretation of particular constitutional texts but the deeper questions of structural relationships left unaddressed by a constitutional text? Such issues were presented in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Printz v. United States 96 and, in Canada, in the Secession Reference case. 97 In Printz, the relationship at issue was between national legislative mandates and state executive or administrative officers; the Court held that the Constitution did not permit national coercion of state officers to execute national law. In the Secession Reference case, the relationship in question was between Quebec and the rest of Canada; the Court recognized a constitutional obligation of good faith negotiation in the event of a clear majority vote on a clear question in favor of secession in Quebec. Each of these issues called for a reading of constitutional "silence"-there was no constitutional text expressly addressing the issue posed. Arguably relevant comparative constitutional experience exists, however, consisting not only of judicial decisions interpreting constitutions but also constitutional provisions establishing structural relationships and ensuing consequences and experience. On each of these issues, comparative constitutional experience can illuminate what is at stake and sharpen analysis, even if it does not supply clear answers to the constitutional questions.
"Commandeering"
The question in Printz was whether federal law could require state or local officials to perform background checks on gun purchasers for a five-year period until a federal system for background checks was available. The majority held not, because this was a form of prohibited "executive commandeering," i.e., where federal mandates require that state or local officials administer a federal regulatory program. Justice Breyer, in dissent, argued that since the U.S. Constitution's text was silent on the issue and there was no dispositive case law, European models of federalism could be consulted to assess the likely consequences of permitting or prohibiting such laws. Noting that other federal polities (including Germany) permitted or even required that national legislation be implemented by the subnational entities, Breyer concluded that the federal law challenged in Printz was not incompatible with healthy forms of federalism.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, disagreed, arguing, in part, that comparative experience was relevant to making but not to interpreting a constitution. 98 Justice Breyer's basic point on the value of comparison in understanding the consequences of different interpretations is well taken, as is the implicit suggestion that on unresolved questions it is helpful to consider the array of reasonable constitutional choices. Yet, as Justice Breyer anticipates but does not fully spell out, 99 there are difficulties in relying on European experience to develop usable U.S. doctrine. Consider Germany. Unlike the U.S. Senate, the Bundesrat-whose approval is required for any law that has administrative enforcement responsibilities for the subnational units-is composed of representatives of the subnational governments who may be more likely to be attentive to financial burdens on their governments. Moreover, the German Basic Law, unlike the U.S. Constitution, requires efforts at equalization of the resources of the subnational units. 100 Thus, the risks to state budgets and state control of state legislative agendas posed by federal "commandeering" in the U.S. are perhaps larger than in Germany. 101 In evaluating the consequences of commandeering, then, usable U.S. doctrine would need to take into account these (and other) systemic differences. In this setting, comparative constitutional experience with federalism may pose a set of questions for domestic constitutional interpreters, 102 but it is less likely to suggest what the best answer for a particular polity would be. distinguishing Peel as involving a burden not "necessarily incidental" to valid federal law and noting that the collection obligation applied only "so far as the province operates as a commercial entity").
Secession
In the wake of democratic change in South Africa and in parts of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and in the shadow of murderous group conflicts in many parts of the world, renewed attention has focused on governance structures and modifications of state boundaries as efforts to respond to these divisions. Although federal structures are often discussed as solutions to tribal, ethnic, or nationalist conflicts, 104 federalism may rigidify or even exacerbate the divisions that it seeks to manage. 105 Federal systems may facilitate secession, insofar as they provide boundaries within which plebiscites can be conducted and which can be used to define a new state, 106 a phenomenon that has generated an important constitutional decision in Canada to be discussed below after a brief background on the debates over the justification for secession and whether secession should be constitutionalized.
Background
Allen Buchanan has suggested that the growth of democracy is logically related to increased interest in a "plebiscatory right to secede."
107 "Opt-out," Plebiscitory theorists argue that liberal democracy itself entails a right to secede insofar as both are grounded in commitments to self-determination and choice; a legitimate democratic state must recognize a right of secession for groups as long as their desire to secede is clearly demonstrated and provided certain other conditions are met, including security for the human rights of members (including minority group members) in the seceding polity and a fair distribution of assets and liabilities. 112 Another group of more restrictive theorists, including Buchanan, argue that secession is justified only as a "remedial right," not to be available as grounds for unilateral secession from legitimate democratic states, in part because recognizing such a right would undermine democracy and majority rule by allowing participants to threaten Determining in particular cases what is a "just cause," or who counts as a "people," is difficult. For example, Buchanan has argued that economic policies that distribute resources from one region to another may be so unjust as to warrant secession. 115 Yet the determination of what is unjust will be highly contentious, since political views about appropriate redistributive policy may vary considerably, and secession rights, if invoked by the wealthier components of existing polities, could diminish the existing capacity for distributive welfare policies. 116 More difficult still is the determination of who would be a sufficiently impartial decision maker for deciding whether or not the requisite justifications for secession were or are present. Efforts to operationalize different moral views sometimes converge in the establishment of procedural sion and federalism can invite exclusionary policies to concentrate the power of homogenous groups in single geographic locations and arguing that federalism will not be a viable solution if it is seen as a "way station" to secession). He notes as a negative example the former Yugoslavia, where existing boundary units of federalism served as predicates for secession (upon votes within each division). Buchanan argues that such a view of secession "is a recipe for undermining whatever promise the federal alternative holds." Id. at 57. 114 The claims of nationalist groups, or "peoples," to secede from states in which they are a minority in order to exercise self-determination rights and to enjoy the values that go along with being an independent "state" have provided "the self-legitimization for just about every serious secessionist movement in the twentieth century." Norman, supra note 111, at 35. hurdles for establishing a right to secede, 117 in part because of the contestability of notions of justice and the absence of an effective international body to judge the justness or legitimacy of proposed secessions. 118 Procedural devices designed to test commitments to secession and avoid impulsive decision making include supermajority voting, or multiple votes over a period of years. These have been identified as useful tools for institutionalizing secession rights, both by those who would limit secession to special situations of remedial justification and by those who believe secession should be available more widely to territorial groups, based on commitments to democratic self-governance. 119 Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational judicial discourse 119 117 See Norman, supra note 111, at 50-51 ("just cause theory may end up grounding secession procedures that look similar to those favored by cautious choice theorists"); Philpott, supra note 112, at 86-87 (arguing that institutionalization of self-determination rights requires an impartial institutional decision maker, majority or supermajority voting, and secession only as a last resort for egregious grievances). Thus, Philpott, a leading self-determinationist, agrees with Buchanan, a leading proponent of the "just-cause remedial right only" approach, that there should be a presumption against secession, insofar as autonomy movements generally should be accommodated within an existing nation so as to assure that the adverse consequences of secessionary struggles be proportionate to the "amount of justice" being sought. His words sound at times more like a just-cause theorist than a self-determination theorist: "Secession is most justifiable when claims to self-determination are in fact enhanced by grievances that are not likely to be remedied short of full independence." Id. at 83. 118 The absence of an international adjudicator with comprehensive jurisdiction and decisional legitimacy on questions of secession, see, e.g., Philpott, supra note 112, at 88 (questioning impartiality of Germany's unilateral decision to recognize as legitimate the secession of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia in 1991), means that debate over national secession differs from debate over "exit" or secession rights in the context of local government, where the existing state can act as arbiter. Donald Horowitz, a leading scholar of ethnic conflict, emphasizes the "limits of territorial solutions to ethnic conflicts" and cautions that the increase in theories of secession might accelerate violent conflicts without improving the problems of mistreatment and subordination of minorities.
120 Secession, especially from illiberal polities, may result in adverse treatment for members of minority groups in the new state, as well as for persons identified with the seceding state who remain behind. 121 Moreover, secession may be inconsistent with many of the benefits of constitutional federalism, including the protection of local minorities, through national governments' enforcing national human rights laws.
122 Secession is sometimes analogized to divorce, or "exit" through emigration, but it is a much higher risk proposition. For unlike individual "exit"-whether from a marriage or a polity-"exit" in the form of national secessions (and except in the case of distant, typically colonial, territories) generally results in a new border between contiguous populations.
123 Secession in such cases, unlike a divorce with a complete division of assets, is more like a form of perpetual and mandatory joint custody of populations that often have intermingled family, property, business, and other interests; risks are much higher-of irredentism, of "ethnic cleansing," and of forced migrations to form more homogenous polities. On the other hand, some secessions have apparently worked out well for populations in both parts of a former state; 125 secession may offer the benefit of affording a group, particularly one that considers itself to have been disadvantaged or abused, to gain not only the benefits of self-governance (some of which can be obtained within a federal system) but the stature and dignity of national sovereignty. Kymlicka distinguishes between the West and the rest of the world, arguing that secession does not, in the West, pose a serious threat to human rights and that in a western democracy, secessionary activity cannot be opposed as illegitimate: "[t]here is no way for a free and democratic country to prevent a self-governing minority from electing secessionist parties and from holding referendums on secession."
126 He and others argue further that "democratic federalism only works (or works best) to inhibit secession when secessionist political mobilization is allowed."
127 These competing views and concerns are echoed in a debate, at the institutional level, about whether secession should be the subject of defined rights or procedures in national constitutions.
Constitutionalizing secession?
Although it seems clear that there are circumstances that would justify secession, the existence of moral justifications for secession does not necessarily imply that rights or procedures concerning secession should be constitutionalized. 128 What domestic constitutions should address is distinct from the question of when secession is justified, or will occur, or will be recognized, whether as a moral matter or as a matter of international law. To the extent that including constitutional clauses authorizing or regulating secession will increase secessionary mobilizations, there is reason for concern, although some proponents of such clauses predict that they will reduce secessionary impulses.
Although the question of constitutionalization is distinct from the morality of secession, if one believed that the principles of self-determination required a plebiscitary right to secede, then one might be more inclined to constitutionalize secession procedures than if one has a more limited moral theory for when secession is justified. But as others have argued, rights of self-determination do not necessarily entail a right of secession but may be satisfied within fair and democratic states. 130 The question of the boundaries of a community that is democratically self-governed is one that cannot itself readily be answered solely through majoritarian methods of self-determination. Claims of democratic legitimacy are most easily made in defined political units. Where secession is on the table and boundaries are contested, democracy and self-determination by themselves do not resolve those questions-for often the subject of controversy will be the very definition of the "people" whose authority to vote is to be respected.
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Arguing for constitutional recognition of secession rights under the limited circumstances prescribed by his "just cause" remedial right theory, Buchanan asserts that such an approach would regularize through law and legal institutions a presumption against secession and thus constrain its use to appropriately limited circumstances.
132 Cass Sunstein has argued, however, that constitutionalizing a right of secession is inconsistent with the basic functions of constitutionalism as a form of precommitment that facilitates the democratic process.
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Constitutionalizing a right to secede, he asserts, would risk diversion from other government business, encourage strategic and shortsighted behavior, and allow too great a minority veto on ordinary decision making. 134 Although Sunstein recognizes that there may be circumstances in which secession is justified "as a matter of political morality," that is not sufficient to warrant a constitutional right to secede. 135 Daniel Weinstock agrees that the presence of moral reasons for secession does not necessarily imply that the right to secede should be constitutionalized; conversely, the absence of moral support for secession rights does not necessarily imply that constitutions should not establish procedures for secession. On his view, there are distinct arguments for constitutionalizing the secession process because (1) secession does not "involve the violation of an absolute moral prohibition," (2) secession movements are "inevitable," and (3) the consequences of including procedures for secession will be better than leaving secession unregulated. 136 Weinstock suggests that legalizing the possibility of secession may well reduce secessionary mobilizations, first, by acknowledging the possibility and thus in some cases defusing mobilization and, second, by erecting procedural hurdles to secession, such as a ten-year waiting period between referenda. 137 The disagreements between Sunstein, on the one hand, and Weinstock and Buchanan on the other, are, to a significant degree, consequentialist disagreements both on the range of circumstances in which secession will, absent constitutionalization, become a pressing political issue and on the effects of constitutionalizing the right. Comparative constitutional experience may shed some light on the latter point.
Comparative constitutional experience
Successful long-term federations have generally not included explicit constitutional rights of secession. Experience further suggests that the presence of general constitutional rights of secession does not appear to have been successful either in avoiding secession (by constraining abusive behavior by the center or by reassuring minority groups), in avoiding violence, or in assuring that secession is carried out fairly and through regular procedures.
Most successful federal unions, including the United States, have not included clauses either waiving or recognizing a right of secession. 138 According to historian Kenneth Stampp, whether or not a state had a unilateral right to secede was genuinely uncertain in the pre-Civil War United States. 139 In some respects, then the question was settled, not by constitution writing at the "founding" moment, but by the American Civil War. 140 The current EU treaty documents do not explicitly provide for rights of secession, 141 nor do the constitutional documents of Australia, Canada, or Germany, although each has amending procedures that arguably could be used to implement a political agreement on secession. 142 Although some suggest that the absence of secession clauses in these constitutions is a historic anomaly due to constitutions being adopted before the rise of multinationalism, 143 others argue that the "general hostility" to secession is a consequence of the importance of territorial integrity to the concept of a state (whether multiethnic or not).
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Federal polities whose constitutions have provided for secession for the most part have neither avoided nor regularized secessions. 145 The Soviet Union's Constitution included a right of secession (in article 72), which had to be-but was not (until 1990 )-implemented by law. 146 The secession clause remained essentially a dead letter, even after a statute was enacted in 1990 ostensibly permitting secession through relatively complex procedures, procedures never used as the mechanism for secession. 147 The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union achieved their status through mechanisms largely outside of existing Soviet law. Yugoslavia's Constitution referred to a right to secession (Basic Principles I), but federal authorities interpreted this right as one that "could not be exercised unilaterally," 148 a conclusion that did not forestall declarations of sovereign independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina and their subsequent recognition by the world community. 149 Nor do secession clauses reliably prevent violence, as occurred in the former Yugoslavia, or regularize procedures, as where the former Czechoslovakia ignored its recently enacted constitutional law providing for a referendum on secession. Indeed, the levels of violence that erupted within the former Yugoslavia have given renewed force to cautionary understandings of ethnic territorial conflict.
Given the very small number of nations with secession clauses, however, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions as to their effects. The Constitution of Ethiopia has, since 1994, included a general right to secede; 150 its application and success remain contested. 151 Although there have been no effective new secessions since its adoption, many argue that human rights abuses and single-party dominance artificially control the devolutionary implications of the secession right. 152 Thus, it is, at best, unclear whether any of the benefits hypothesized by secession theorists have accrued from the presence of a general right to secede-whether in terms of avoiding secession, constraining abuse of minorities by the central government, or assuring the justness of the terms of the secession.
The adoption of very specific legal provisions concerning secession has sometimes functioned as a prelude to actual secession. It was reported that, in late 1990, Slovenia passed a constitutional law creating a right to secede from Yugoslavia and shortly thereafter it did so. 153 In Czechoslovakia, a law providing for a referendum was enacted in 1991, followed by the splitting up of the state the next year (though without resort to the referendum procedure). 154 In early 1990, debate began over the official name of the country, following the end of the Soviet influence. The question of secession arose (early drafts of a proposed Slovak constitution included a right to secede) 155 and in 1991, a constitutional act was adopted requiring the use of a referendum if one republic sought to secede. As noted above, no referendum was held, in part because of Slovak insistence that it was not seceding but acting on its sovereignty and, perhaps, in part because the leadership knew that, based on available polling data, a majority of the population might well reject secession were a referendum to be held. 156 The tiny country of Saint Kitts and Nevis poses a more ambiguous example: it obtained independence in 1983 under a constitution that authorized Nevis to secede upon a two-thirds vote by referendum. In 1998, a vote was taken that, with 62 percent voting in favor of secession, fell short of the two-thirds prior Constitution in referring to the Czechs and Slovaks as two sovereign nations and by constituting an upper house in which the two parts of the country had equal representation, notwithstanding the Czechs' numerical superiority. See generally STEIN, supra note 13, at 23, 37, 49-50. 155 See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 634 n.6. The post-independence Constitution, however, does not provide for secession from its territory. See SLOVK. CONST. art. 3 (stating that territory "is united and indivisible" and may be changed only by constitutional law); but cf. id. art. 7 (requiring that if Slovakia enters into an alliance with other states it must reserve a unilateral right to secede). 156 See Slosarcik, supra note 64, at 540; STEIN, supra note 13, at 248 (reporting that in October 1992, when agreements between the two governments for separation had been negotiated, only 37 percent of Slovaks considered the separation to be necessary); McGarry, supra note 121, at 220 (describing Slovak secession as "largely an elite project" with only 8 percent in 1990 in Slovakia supporting secession). Elite opinion may both vary from and help shape public views and reactions, and political party leaders may sometimes polarize different publics on questions relating to secession. These examples suggest that a law, even if not followed, may be able to play some role in providing for a more orderly process of secession, once the parties become convinced that it is a real possibility. Or it may be that the relative peacefulness vel non of these latter secessionary transitions was related more to general levels of political violence and commitments to the rule of law than to any specific constitutional or legal text.
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Designing constitutions is not an exercise in pure logic; an important purpose of a constitution is to try to facilitate workable governance for actual polities. Experience is thus of particular importance to issues of constitutional design. 160 What experience suggests, albeit tentatively, is that where constitutions have provided for a general right to secession, the "right" has been contested-as in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia-when secessionary impulses emerge. Experience also suggests that the crafting of provisions specifically to respond to particular secessionary movements has sometimes been followed by secession. 161 Yet this experience is limited and may change if the global conditions for domestic constitutional law change through evolution of international or transnational legal regimes.
Cautions and the psychology of constitutional judgment
On so mixed an empirical record, caution is warranted before embracing legal-and, especially, hard-to-change constitutional-approaches to secession. This caution is reinforced by insights from the cognitive and behavioral sciences. First, although some proponents of a permissive right of secession assume that self-determination movements are exogenous to legal structures, 162 sensitive institutional design must consider the capacity of law to affect or reconstitute people's desires and values. As sociolegal research reveals law's capacity to reshape the very categories through which individuals understand their society, law's potential to influence the development of culture and identity raises further concerns about constitutionalizing secession rights. 163 Professor Weinstock himself has noted the "malleability" of national identity, which, he says, is "born of identifiable political struggles and institutional contexts" 164 and which, in turn, implies that national identity may itself be influenced by the "institution" of law.
Second, consider the incentives created by law, but now with the assumption that citizens' identities and preferences for secession are independent of law. As Buchanan and others have observed, specifying secession procedures may create perverse incentives both for proponents of the existing state and end (see supra note 136) is intriguing-and may prove true in Saint Kitts and Nevis. But the possibility also exists that the work done to identify and articulate such a right might make it more likely that the right will be exercised, rather than less likely, as discussed in the text below. 162 Philpott, for example, states, "The question of self determination arises when, by definition, the unity of a political order has already been seriously ruptured," apparently assuming that secessionary impulses are independent of legal regimes. See Philpott, supra note 112, at 83. See also Weinstock, supra note 108, at 261 (treating secessionist agitation as inevitable and stating that "secessionist agitation occurs regardless of the legal status which states ascribe to it"). 164 See Weinstock, supra note 108, at 254-55 (noting malleability of national identity and its relationship to cost-benefit calculations by political agents in particular contexts and arguing that if the international legal order looks for distinct national identities it will create new incentives altering the behavior of political actors). These concerns might be reinforced by findings concerning the "endowment" effect, which suggests that people tend to value more highly that which they already own or to which they have rights. (1999) . Whether recognition of a legal right to secede would make people value that right and thus act on it, though, is uncertain for various reasons, among them: (1) the uncertain application of the endowment effect to collective action; (2) the uncertainty about what people will assume is the baseline of current entitlement, e.g., whether seceding is the use of an existing entitlement, a "gain," or a loss by incurring financial obligations, say, to the remainder state; (3) the uncertain application of the endowment effect to decisions that are framed as political (self-government vs. rule by others) rather than economic (e.g., willingness to buy or sell); and proponents of secession. Proponents of the existing state may seek to hinder population movements (or encourage others) in order to prevent the requisite majority from building demographic power in a defined area, with the attendant risks of discrimination, "ethnic cleansing," and the like; proponents of secession have similar incentives to discourage settlement and encourage population growth to increase support for secession. Professor Weinstock's procedural rules, requiring ten years between secession referenda, may simply allow more time for this to happen.
Third, consider the possible effects of the negotiation and consideration of secession clauses at the time of drafting and adoption of a new constitution, especially if these processes occur in a crisis-ridden moment. 165 In addition to the general difficulty they may have in appreciating how the "rules of the game" will affect results, 166 those drafting a new constitution are likely to be primarily focused on how to make the structures of everyday governance work. 167 Although constitutions typically provide for their own amendment and, in that sense, anticipate and provide for change, anticipating secession at the time of initiating a new constitutional regime may not be conducive to good medium-range thinking, if the participants assume they need not work out other difficulties because they have a clear exit option. 168 Moreover, there is reason to doubt our abilities to anticipate, at any given time, how we will view important matters should circumstances change in the future.
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This phenomenon challenges any form of binding in advance-in marriage, contracts, or entrenched constitutions generally. 170 But this difficulty may be of special importance to events that appear remote, as secession may appear, to a group negotiating an instrument for the future government of a specific polity. 171 politics of "voice"over "exit"). The threat of "exit" by one entire community from another (other than as a last resort defense to highly abusive conditions) may occur (or be thought to occur) in circumstances in which exploitative prospects are high and which may undermine the loyalty and commitment to the democratic majoritarian process necessary for government to work. difficulty imagining how they will feel or behave if their emotional state is different at a future time, leading to prediction errors that are resistant to correction through experience). Although contract drafters routinely consider what happens in the event of breach, anticipating the bases for secessionary impulses and how to respond may be far more difficult, given the more encompassing relationships embraced in a national state than in a business relationship. 170 Marriage analogies loom large in the literature on secession, yet I have been unable to find systematic data on the relationship of prenuptial agreements to the duration and success of marriages (or on the orderliness or "justness" of subsequent divorce). For a suggestive study on a related point, see Lynn A. of divorce in general nonetheless had "unrealistic" optimism about their own marriages). Noting the potential advantages of this unrealistic optimism in increasing motivation and persistence in the relationship, Baker and Emery also point out optimism's costs, which, they suggest, prenuptial agreements on property disposition in the event of divorce might mitigate. 171 A dilemma is illustrated by juxtaposing two scholars' views. Professor Norman notes that without secessionary activism, existing states will not "tempt fate" by including a constitutional clause regulating secession. Norman, supra note 111, at 55. Professor Weinstock argues, by contrast, that "the time to entrench a secession provision is . . . when secession seems at most a distant possibility," not an imminent threat. Weinstock, supra note 136, at 198. The impartiality to which Weinstock aspires-see id. at 198-99 (suggesting that behind the Rawlsian veil reasonable people would provide for secession but not make it too easy)-is in tension with a realistic assessment of what drives people to rework entrenched constitutions. Different horns of this dilemma may be more likely in different contexts: the reluctance to deal with secession when it appears remote might be more likely in a "centralizing" federation where the political momentum behind constitution making is to form a closer union; the adverse effects (including distraction from the details of workable governing structures) of negotiating an entrenched secession clause when secession looms as a political matter may be greater in devolutionary federal constitution making.
Finally, ideology, trust, and commitment to the rule of law may play significant roles in successful federated states. As one study of twentieth-century postcolonial "centralizing" federations concluded, "the absence of a positive political or ideological commitment to the primary goal of federation as an end in itself among" leaders and people in federating units makes "success improbable, if not impossible." 172 An ideological commitment to the building of a national identity that can stand alongside subnational identities seems in considerable tension with negotiating rights of secession. Although constitutions are framed on the premise that people are not "angels," 173 no complex constitutional arrangement can work without some measure of trust or loyalty by the parts to the whole, a concept that German constitutional law expresses as Bundestreue, or "pro-federal loyalty." 174 Such loyalty and trust may be more difficult to sustain if secession is constitutionalized and available as a threat. 175 Commitment to the rule of law in a federal democracy, associated with greater degrees of subnational compliance with national law, 176 entails commitment to the rules by which political decisions (and winners and losers) are made, a commitment in tension with the right of a losing party to walk out on the game. 177 In trying to evaluate the consequences of constitutionalizing secession rights-and, in particular, whether it makes secessions more or less likely-we are faced with and must acknowledge much uncertainty. 178 The "safety valve"
and other related arguments suggest that secession clauses may, at least in some circumstances, do more good than harm because, if secession is likely, regularizing its accomplishment through law is vastly preferable to the use of violence. 179 But overall, and on the evidence to date, comparative constitutionalists should be wary of general claims in favor of constitutionalizing territorial "exit" rights for parts of a country, especially to the extent that national states continue to play primary governmental roles in the world legal order.
Debate about constitutional rights of secession, however, should not proceed in isolation from the actual and varied circumstances in which constitution-making occurs. Constitution making takes place not only in paradigmatic constitutional "moments," through specially selected representative bodies or plebiscites, but also in more drawn-out constitutional eras (as may be occurring now in Europe), or through the ordinary constitutional amendment processes, or even through judicial decision making. The contexts in which this work occurs can vary across other axes, for example, the extent to which a federation's constituent parts are heterogeneously populated, or whether there are many or only a few constituent parts. 180 Federal constitution making may occur in many historic settings, including: (1) devolutionary federalism, where, as in Belgium, an existing unitary state devolves constitutional powers to its subnational units; (2) as a centralizing move from confederation to federation, as was the case for the United States in 1789 and Switzerland; or (3) as a gradual consolidation of former colonies into a single national state, as was arguably the case for both Australia and Canada.
While there may be important reasons to support Sunstein's views against providing for secession in "founding" periods of federal constitution making, when the need for mutual trust and investment in building a polity is high, 181 these reasons may not apply so fully in other contexts of constitution making. In some polities, secession or opt-out clauses may have been thoroughly deliberated or have been on the table for so long that their inclusion is inevitable, and comparative study may help in evaluating the benefits and risks of particular procedural devices. In some polities, secession clauses may pose lower risks (i.e., if the polity has been peacefully trending, over time, toward partition). 182 Comparative experience suggests that, along with some wariness about constitutionalizing secession rights, it may be useful to distinguish between constitutional approaches to secession in founding moments or as an a priori matter, on the one hand, and more flexible legal approaches to secession when political momentum has been substantially mobilized.
Constitutional options expanded
As both the Secession Reference case and the debate over the union in the American Civil War suggest, there are at least three possible constitutional approaches to secession. 183 A constitution can provide in some way for secession (whether through designation of a right under certain circumstances or by procedures that would apply if a question arose, or both); it can prohibit secession; or it can be silent or ambiguous on the issue. Comparative constitutional experience, which is mixed, might be read to suggest that leaving the issue unresolved may, in some situations, facilitate development of a successful and stable federal system.
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Consider Canada, whose constitutional text is silent on secession. The silence created the possibility that, outside of the specified procedures for amending the Constitution, secession was simply prohibited. In the Secession Reference case, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that there were unwritten but basic "underlying principles" in the Constitution of federalism, Secession Reference draws on the stature of an institution that may be regarded as more impartial than other organs of the national government. 195 Invoking constitutional court jurisdiction to resolve the procedures by which live disputes over secession can be dealt with may, in some polities, be preferable to trying to fix terms and procedures further in advance, and in the absence of major secessionary activity. 196 To the extent that it is legitimate to be concerned with the effect of negotiating or including secession clauses at founding moments, the Secession Reference opens up the possibilities for a legalized response to the emergence of higher levels of secessionary activity after the founding period. 
Conclusion
Transnational judicial discourse analyzing discrete constitutional texts allocating powers in federal systems may be limited by the variable, interdependent and historically contingent framework of federalism in which each text is embedded. Understanding constitutional federalism in a comparative setting may, however, be of real assistance to courts in their elaboration of federal norms in the silences of constitutional texts on issues that become important over time in the balance Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational judicial discourse 137 not mandate, a particular course of action based on a rule or principle in a judicial case or controversy." Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1710 (1998) . This characterization raises a number of questions, including whether the characteristics of a constitutional court that enable it to engage in binding adjudication also enable it to be a good advice giver, and whether advice giving as distinct from conventional adjudication will adversely affect judicial legitimacy. Cf. Choudhry & Howse, supra note 188, at 145 (for constitutional adjudication to be legitimate it "must be supported by reasons that justify the judicial role"). These questions transcend the issues of comparative constitutional federalism with which this essay is primarily concerned, so they will need to be addressed elsewhere. of federal relations. Where text is silent, understanding the range of constitutional alternatives and their possible consequences through consideration of other constitutional federations' experiences may be helpful both to clear analysis of the particular federal system and to prudent constitutional decisions.
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